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STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY*

The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred
Years Later: Buried, Not Praised**
ABSTRACT
The "Harmon Doctrine" is perhaps the most notorious theory in all
of international natural resources law. Based upon an opinion of
Attorney General Judson Harmon issued a hundred years ago, the
doctrine holds that a country is absolutely sovereign over the portion
of an internationalwatercoursewithin its borders. Thus that country
would be free to divert all of the water from an international
watercourse,leaving none for downstream states. This article looks
closely at the Harmon Doctrine in historical context. An examination of the conduct of the United States during the dispute with
Mexico over the Rio Grande that produced the Doctrine,as well as
other contemporaneous and subsequent practice, demonstrates that
the United States never actually followed the Doctrine in its
practice.It is therefore highly questionable whether this doctrine is,
or ever was, a part of internationallaw.
I. INTRODUCTION
The law of international watercourses has developed in tandem
with the evolution of human social organization and the intensification
of use by human societies of fresh water.' Water is of course essential to
human and other forms of life, but it also fuels industry and facilitates
commerce. In terms of their relative importance to states, however,
navigation held sway over other uses of watercourses until the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. "With the beginning of the
industrial revolution water needs for irrigation, water-power, navigation,
flood control and water supply experienced a sharp increase."2 One
region in which the growth of irrigation agriculture was especially

* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I would like
to express my appreciation to Jeffrey Carra, UOP McGeorge School of Law class of 1996, for
the excellent assistance he cheerfully provided in connection with the preparation of this
article.
** Portions of this article draw upon a forthcoming book by the author on the Law of
International Watercourses.
1. See generally LuDwiK TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW (1967).
2. U.N. Dep't of Economic & Social Affairs, Integrated River Basin Development,
Report of a Panel of Experts at 2, U.N. Doc. E/3066/Rev.1 (1970).
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pronounced was the southwestern United States. Irrigated acreage in this
area virtually doubled in the first thirty years of this century. Diversions
for irrigation purposes had already increased sharply during the last
twenty years of the 19th century.' As the intensity of non-navigational
uses of international watercourses grew, a body of law dealing with those
uses began to develop. But the development of the law in this area did
not keep pace with the intensification of non-navigational uses. Obviously, rules relating to navigation, which were well-developed and broadly
accepted, could not simply be transplanted to the field of
non-navigational uses.' States therefore had to rely upon more general
concepts, such as that of territorial sovereignty, to regulate their relations
in this area.
But the fact that the water contained in international watercourses
is in constant motion has made its non-navigational uses particularly
challenging as a subject of international legal regulation. It is axiomatic,
for example, that a state is sovereign within its territory.6 In this sense,
"sovereignty" implies complete and exclusive authority over that

3. Teclaff, supra note I at 83, noting that irrigated land in the western United States

increased from 7,543,000 acres in 1900 to 14,086,000 acres in 1930.
4. A 1896 report indicated that with regard to the Rio Grande alone
an aggregate of 1,074 [diversion] canals taken out in Colorado and New
Mexico prior to 1880 and 1,528 taken from the river and its tributaries at
this date, showing an increase of 454 canals and of 196,000 acres irrigated
in the State of Colorado and Territory of New Mexico.... There are no
reliable records available showing the increase in the preceding years, but
they were doubtless on a more rapidly increasing ratio.
Report of the International water Boundary Commission of Nov. 25,1896, annexed to letter
of 25 Nov. 1896 from Col. Anson Mills, Commissioner, to the Secretary of State, reprinted
in The Rio Grande Claim (U.S. v. Gt. Brit.), Am. & Brit. Claims Arb. 1910, Pleadings &
Awards, vol. 22, Claim No. 83 (1923), Appendix to the Answer of the United States, 261, 265
(1923) [hereinafter U.S. Appendixl.
5. To this effect, see Georges Sauser-Hall, L'Utilisation Industrielle des Fleuves
Internationaux,83 REC. DES CoURs 465,475, (1953-I) (referring to Charles Rousseau.) It may
be, however, that certain principlesare applicable to both kinds of uses. In particular, the
reference of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the River Order case to a
"community of interest of riparian States ... in a navigable river," 1929 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A, No.
16), at 27, has been applied by commentators to problems involving non-navigational uses,
even though the case itself involved navigation. See, e.g., Lucius Caflisch, Rlgles Gniralesdu
Droit des Cours d'Eau Internationaux,219 REC. DES COURS (1989-VID 9, 60 (1992); JOHAN
LAMMERS, POLLtrON OF INERNATIONAL WATERCoURSES 507 (1984); JEROME LPPER, Equitable
Utilization, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 15, 29 (Albert H. Garretson, et
Cal, eds., 1967).

6. "[TMhe jurisdiction of the state over its territory is called territorial sovereignty."
Milan Sahovit & William Bishop, The Authority of the State: Its Range with Respect to Persons
and Places, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, 311, 314 (Max Sorensen, ed., 1968).
"[Tihe jurisdiction of a state over its territory is the basis of its activity...

."

Id. at 313.
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territory. 7 However, does it necessarily follow that international law
imposes no constraints upon a state's use within its territory of a river
that flows into another state? Does a downstream state have no right to
object to uses of a watercourse in an upstream state that result in harm
to the former?8 And what of the sovereignty of the downstream state
over its territory? Is it proper to regard that as having been infringed if
actions in the upstream state unfavorably alter the characteristics of the
portion of the watercourse in the downstream state?
These questions attracted the interest of scholars beginning early
in the nineteenth century.9 Theories ranged from one extreme to the
other. At one end of the continuum was the doctrine of "absolute
territorial sovereignty," according to which a state could do virtually as
it pleased with the portion of an international watercourse within its
territory-at least short of changing its course so it entered the downstream state at a different location-irrespective of the harmful consequences in the downstream state. At the other extreme was the doctrine
of "absolute territorial integrity," which held that the upstream state
could do nothing to interfere with the natural flow of the river into the
downstream state."0 While it seems obvious that neither of these extreme
theories is suited to today's interdependent world, each was asserted at
early stages of the development of the law in this field. Even today there
are instances, albeit isolated and infrequent ones, in which states have
taken positions that bear a striking similarity to these doctrines."
The doctrine of "absolute territorial sovereignty" is most often
identified with an opinion prepared in 1895 by an Attorney General of
the United States, Judson Harmon, in response to a request by the
Department of State for advice concerning a dispute with Mexico over the
use of waters of the Rio Grande. This opinion has become so synonymous with the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty that it now
stands as the doctrine's cornerstone, if not its entire foundation. The
centennial of the "Harmon Doctrine" invites a close examination of this
theory with a view to determining its international legal status. This
article will undertake only a portion of such an examination, focusing

7. Id. at 316.
8. A negative answer to this question is suggested by Sahovid & Bishop: "[Tihe
territorial sovereignty of a state must not be exercised in a manner detrimental to other
states but in good faith in compliance with international obligations and with international
law in general." Supra note 6, at 316 (citing the Corfu Channel case, 1949 I.CJ. Rep. 22).
9. See generally the surveys of scholarly opinion in F. BiERER, RivEs IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 11-40 (1959) (surveying scholarly opinion).
10. These and other theories are discussed in Berber, supra note 9; and Lipper, supra
note 5, at 16-40.
11. See, e.g., Lipper, supra note 5, at 18-22; and Caflisch, supra note 5, at 16-40 (both
surveying state practice).
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upon the historical context in which the doctrine was articulated and its
observance, or lack thereof, in subsequent United States practice. The
dispute that formed the crucible of the doctrine serves as a valuable case
study because it shows that a position formally taken by a state in a
particular diplomatic exchange may reflect advocacy more than a
detached view of the law, and thus may be a position the state would not
be willing to abide by if its situation in that or a similar controversy were
reversed. The article will conclude that if the United States ever embraced
the doctrine, except as a matter of advocacy in a particular dispute, it has
long since ceased to do so.
II. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED
STATES OVER UTILIZATION OF THE RIO GRANDE
A.

Introduction: The Rio Grande

While no doubt an important river for the arid regions of
southwestern United States and northeastern Mexico, the Rio Grande is
not among the world's largest rivers, in terms of either length or runoff.
The river rises in the United States and flows some 1,885 miles," 1,240
of which form the border between the United States and Mexico, before
emptying into the Gulf of Mexico. This qualifies the Rio Grande as the
fifth longest river in North America.3 While estimates of its average
runoff vary from 82 to 120 cubic meters per second, 4 only a fraction of
that of the Colorado," all studies agree that the river places at or near
the bottom of the list of significant international watercourses in this
category. From its source in the San Juan Mountains of southwestern
Colorado, the Rio Grande flows for some 645 miles through Colorado
and New Mexico before becoming the boundary between the United

12. 24 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 1023 (1987). Like nearly all data, estimates of the
length of rivers vary considerably. Thus the length of the Rio Grande has been placed at
distances ranging from 2,870 to 3,034 kilometers. WATER INCRIsIS 153 (Peter H. Gleick, ed,
1993).
13. 24 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 12, at 1023.
14. Water In Crisis, supranote 12, at 146,147. This volume presents data from different
sources on this and other questions. The 82 figure is from a 1981 study by E. Czaya, while
that of 120 is from one of 1982 by K. Szestay. Id. at 145. A third study, by M. Meybeck
(1988), places the Rio Grande's runoff at 100 cubic meters per second-again the lowest
quantity on the list of, in the case of that study, 47 rivers. Id.
15. The same studies place the runoff of the Colorado at quantities varying from 580
(Szestay) to 640 (Meybeck) cubic meters per second. WATER IN CRISIs, supra note 12, at 147,
148. However, Czaya estimates that river's flow at the U.S.-Mexico border to be a mere 168
cubic meters per second. Id., at 146.
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States and Mexico."

B. The Events Leading Up To the Issuance of Harmon's Opinion
A controversy arose in the latter part of the 19th century over
diversions of water from the Rio Grande in the United States. 7 In
October, 1894, the Mexican Minister at Washington, Matfas Romero, sent
a note to American Secretary of State W.Q. Gresham transmitting a copy
of a communication to Romero from the consul of Mexico at El Paso.
Romero emphasized that the communication
shows the urgent necessity that exists for a decision of the
question relative to the taking of water from the Rio Bravo
(Rio Grande) del Norte in the State of Colorado and the Territory of New Mexico, which has so seriously affected the existence of the frontier communities for several miles below Paso
del Norte [Ciudad Juarez'

]

... and points out the danger

lest otherwise those communities may be annihilated. 9
The communication of the Mexican consul provides insight into the
seriousness of the situation. The consul, Josd Zayas Guarneros, believed
that the disposition of this question would decide "the existence or the
disappearance of the frontier towns" of both Ciudad Juarez and El Paso,
Texas. His letter gives a grim account of the economic straits of Ciudad

Juarez and states that "Ithere remains no other recourse for the
maintenance of tranquillity pending the settlement of the main question
...

than the equitable division of the waters of the river." 20 Minister

Romero closed his note to the American Secretary of State by soliciting
"an examination
and decision of this grave question" by the State
2
Department. '

16. Specifically, the river forms the boundary between the U.S. State of Texas and the
Mexican States of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Le6n, and Tamaulipas.
17. For a description of the problems of this period between the United States and
Mexico relating to international rivers, see James Simsarian, The Diversion of Waters Affecting
the United States and Mexico, 17 TEx. L. REV. 27 (1939). See also Jacob Austin, Canadian-United
States Practiceand Theory Respecting the InternationalLaw of InternationalRivers: A Study of the
History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 CAN. BAR REV. 393, 405411 (1959).
18. Ciudad Juarez is a Mexican community directly across the river from El Paso,
Texas.
19. Letter from Minister Romero to Secretary Gresham (12 Oct. 1894), reprinted in
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 395 (1894). See also 1 Moore DiGEsT OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (hereinafter DGESF) at 764.
20. Letter from Mr. Guarneros to Mr. Romero (4 Oct. 1894), reprinted in FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 395-96 (1894).
21. Id.
at 395.
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The Secretary of State responded just over two weeks later.22 He
informed the Mexican Minister that he had referred the latter's earlier
note of September 10 concerning the same question to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. He further informed the Minister that the Department of Agriculture was of the opinion that "it is by no means certain
that the low state of the Rio Grande at Ciudad Juarez and vicinity is due
to the utilization of water for irrigation along the upper course of the
river to a greater extent than heretofore."2 Secretary Gresham went on
to observe that Ciudad Juarez had frequently experienced failures of
water supply in the past, and opined that the current problem "is
satisfactorily explained by the drought that has prevailed over the
headwaters of the Rio Grande for the last two or three years, and over
the territory around El Paso for six or eight years."" He then stated that
"[tlhe evidence in the possession of the Department of Agriculture does
not show any material increase in the utilization of water for irrigation
on the Upper Rio Grande for several years past."' Finally, Secretary
Gresham informed Minister Romero that his note of October 12 had also
been referred to the Secretary of Agriculture.2
Thus, far from being a legalistic denial of any obligation to
provide water to Mexico, the initial response of the U.S. Government to
the Mexican complaint was a purely factual one. Furthermore, while
Secretary Gresham did not give Minister Romero the kind of response the
latter doubtless would have liked, neither did he in any way close the
door to further discussions of the problem. A cooperative attitude is also
reflected in the message to Congress delivered by President Cleveland in
December of the same year, in which the President stated: "The problem
of the storage and use of the waters of the Rio Grande for irrigation
should be solved by appropriate concurrent action of the two interested
countries. " 27
The shortages of Rio Grande water experienced by Mexican
communities in the vicinity of Ciudad Juarez had been called to the
attention of the Department of War earlier, in an 1890 report from the
U.S. Army officer in charge of the Department of Texas. The report
described the alarm of the Mexicans along the Rio Grande at what they
considered a violation of their riparian rights by American withdrawals

22. Letter from Secretary Gresham to Minister Romero (Nov. 1, 1894), printed in
FOREIGN RELATIONs, supra note 20 at 397.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. President Grover Cleveland, Annual Message, Dec. 3, 1894, 1 Moore DIGEST, supra
note 19, at 764.
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of water to irrigate the San Luis valley in Colorado, which was said to
have left the Rio Grande a dry bed for 500 miles.3
Evidencing a broad recognition of the seriousness of the situation
even as early as 1890, the U.S. Congress in that year passed a concurrent
resolution concerning the problem.' In its second preambular paragraph
the resolution specifically acknowledged that upstream diversions from
the Rio Grande were depriving those in the Juarez-El Paso area of water:
by means of irrigating ditches and canals taking the water
from said river and other causes, the usual supply of water
therefrom has been exhausted before it reaches the point
where it divides the United States of America from the
Republic of Mexico, thereby rendering the lands in its valley
arid and unproductive, to the great detriment of the citizens
of the two countries who live along its course .... ."
The resolution described these and other conditions3 1 as a "standing
menace to the harmony and prosperity of the citizens of said countries,
and the amicable and orderly administration of their respective Governments ... ."' The two houses of Congress therefore resolved that the
President be requested to enter into negotiations with Mexico with a view
to resolving, inter alia, the Rio Grande water problems.
Mexico having received no satisfaction from the United States in
response to its note of October, 1894, Minister Romero sent another note
concerning the problem to the State Department dated October 21,
1895.1 In this communication Romero carefully described the arid
condition of the Ciudad Juarez region, demonstrating the dependence of
farmers there on Rio Grande water for irrigation of their crops.' He
stated that during the nearly 300-year existence of Ciudad Juarez, its
inhabitants had irrigated their land with water from the Rio Grande.

28. Report of General Stanley to Secretary of War, Sept. 12 1889, quoted in "Irrigation
of Arid Lands-International Boundary-Mexican Relations," H.R. Rep. No. 490, 51st Cong.,
Ist Sess. 3 (1890).
29. Concurrent Resolution of 29 Apr. 1890 "concerning the irrigation of arid lands in

the valley of the Rio Grande River, the construction of a dam across said river at or near El
Paso, Tex., for the storage of its waste waters, and for other purposes," 51st.Cong., 1st Sess.,
21 CoNG. REc. 3963, 3977 (1890); U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 145. This resolution is
referred to in the opinion of Attorney General Judson Harmon, 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1895).

30. Concurrent Resolution of 29 Apr. 1890, supra note 29 at 3977.

31. The other conditions referred to were changes in course of the river due to flooding
resulting in confusion as to the location of the boundary.
32. Concurrent Resolution of Apr. 29, 1890, supra note 29 at 3977.31.
33. Letter from Matas Romero, Mexican Minister, to Richard Olney, Secretary of State
(Oct. 21, 1895), reprinted in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 200, 202.
34. "[Total rainfall from August 15, 1893, to August 14, 1894, was 4.97 inches, or next
to nothing at all." Id. at 200-01.
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According to Romero, the city and districts within its jurisdiction did not
need more than 20 cubic meters of water per second for their crops,
which he described as "an almost infinitesimal portion of the amount of
water which flowed down the river, even in times of severest
drought .... ."I He stated that they therefore "had sufficient water for
their crops until about 10 years ago [i.e., 18851, when a great many
trenches were dug in the State of Colorado (especially in the St. Louis
[San Luis) Valley), and in the Territory of New Mexico, through which
the Rio Grande and its affluents flow."' Romero charged that because
of these diversions the river's flow at El Paso had been diminished to
such an extent that there was a scarcity of water from mid-June until
March, "which is the very time when water is most needed for the
crops."3 He stated that in 1894 "the river became dried up entirely by
the 15th of June," and that "[in that year the farmers were unable to
raise any Indian corn, vegetables, or grapes, and the scarcity of water was
such that even the fruit trees began to wither."' According to Minister
Romero, this situation had led to a decrease in land values and a
reduction of the population in the communities in the vicinity of Ciudad
Juarez from 20,000 in 1875 to 10,000 in 1894.?
Romero drew attention to the 1890 joint resolution of Congress
calling upon the President to enter into negotiations with Mexico
concerning the problem but stated that despite his efforts on behalf of the
government of Mexico, it had not been possible "to make much progress
in this matter."' Romero then outlined the legal position of Mexico.
First, Mexico contended that the American diversions violated Article VII
of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which provides in part: "the
navigation of the [Rio Grande] below [the southern boundary of New
Mexico] shall be free and common to the vessels and citizens of both
countries; and neither shall, without the consent of the other, construct
any work that may impede or interrupt, in whole or in part, the exercise
of this right . . . ." Romero referred to an 1850 U.S. Army report
indicating that an Army officer had traveled up the Rio Grande "with a
vessel, reaching a point several kilometers above [El Paso], which shows
that it was navigable at that time."4 2 According to Mexico, the irrigation
ditches in Colorado and New Mexico fell within the treaty's prohibition
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
Malloy
42.

Id. at 201.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
id. at 202.
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2,1848, U.S.-Mex., at Art. VII, reprinted in I
DIGEST at 1107, 1111.
Id.
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of works that would interfere with navigation, since "nothing could
impede it more absolutely than works which wholly turn aside the water
of these rivers." 3 Minister Romero went on to say that even if the treaty
did not apply to the problem,
the principles of international law would form a sufficient
basis for the rights of the Mexican inhabitants of the bank of
the Rio Grande. Their claim to the use of the water of that
river is incontestable, being prior to that of the inhabitants of
Colorado by hundreds of years, and, according to the principles of civil law, a prior claim takes precedence in case of
dispute."
The note concluded by expressing Mexico's strong interest in negotiating
with the United States an arrangement for the distribution of Rio Grande
waters.
C.

The Harmon Opinion

The U.S. Department of State did not at that time have its own,
in-house legal adviser, but referred legal questions to the Department of
Justice, headed by the Attorney General.' Secretary of State Richard
Olney therefore referred Minister Romero's note of 21 October 1895 to
Attorney General Judson Harmon.' Olney drew the Attorney General's
attention to the concurrent resolution adopted by Congress in 1890 and
stated that "[tihe negotiations with which the President... is charged by
the foregoing resolution, can not be intelligently conducted unless the
legal rights and obligations of the two Governments concerned and the
responsibility of either, if any, for the disastrous state of things depicted
in the Mexican Minister's letter are first ascertained."47 He therefore
requested Harmon to prepare an opinion on the soundness of Mexico's
legal claims, asking specifically whether Article VII of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo was "still in force" and whether Mexico's claims

43. U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 202; also quoted in 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1895).
44. Id.
45. The position of Legal Adviser of the Department of State was not created until 1931.
Act of Feb. 23, 1931, P.L. 71-715,46 Stat. 1214 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2654 (1988)). Until that
time, the chief legal officer of the State Department had been an official of the Department
of Justice: the "Solicitor" from 1891-1930; and the Examiner of Claims from 1870 to 1891.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND UNITED STATES CHIEF OF MISSION, 1778-1990 (1991).
46. Letter from Richard Olney, Secretary of State, to Judson Harmon, Attorney General
(5 Nov. 1895), printed in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 203. The relevant portions of the
Secretary of State's letter are quoted in Harmon's opinion, 21 Op.Att'y Gen. 274,275 (1895).
47. U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 204.
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were supported by principles of international law independent of any
treaty obligation.*
The Attorney General's response addressed both of these
questions.' As to the treaty, Harmon's view was that Article VII applied
only to "'the part of the Rio Bravo del Norte [Rio Grande] lying below
the southern boundary of New Mexico,"'" and "[ilt is that part alone
which is made free and common to the navigation of both countries, and
to which the various prohibitions apply."5' Thus Harmon interpreted
Article VII to mean that any activities taking place north of the southern
boundary of New Mexico-i.e., the point at which the Rio Grande
becomes a contiguous watercourse-were outside the scope of the article,
and therefore the treaty.'2 This construction is by no means dictated by
the terms of the article, and in fact seems strained by today's standards.
The article merely provides that there shall be freedom of navigation for
both countries on the Rio Grande below the New Mexico border, and that
neither country is to construct any work that may interfere with this right

48. Id.
49. Letter to Judson Harmon, Attorney General, from Richard Olney, Secretary of State
(Dec. 12, 1895), printed in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 204. The Secretary of State's letter
does not actually ask whether Art. VII of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo would
provide a basis for Mexico's claims, only whether it was still in force as far as the Rio
Grande was concerned (Harmon concluded it was). Nevertheless, the Attorney General
responded to each of Mexico's legal claims, i.e., that the American diversions violated either
the treaty or principles of international law independent of any special treaty or convention.
Id.
50. 21 Op. Atty Gen. 274, 277. Harmon quoted from Article VII of the treaty. He also
noted that Article IV of the Gadsden treaty of Dec. 30,1853 continued Article VII of the 1848
treaty in force only as to the Rio Grande below the point at which it became the boundary
between the United States and Mexico as provided in the 1853 treaty. Gadsden Treaty, Dec.
30, 1853, US.-Mex., at Article IV, Represinted in 1 MALLoY Digest 1121, 1123. However,
Article IV was motivated not by a wish to ensure freedom to divert unlimited quantities of
water from the Rio Grande north of the boundary, but by the fact that "[tihe provisions of
the 6th and 7th articles of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo [were] rendered nugatory for
the most part by the cession of territory granted in the first article of this [i.e., the 19531
treaty .... ." Id. Thus the portions of Article VII of the 1948 treaty that were "rendered
nugatory" were those concerning the boundary in and freedom of navigation on the river
Gila, which before the Gadsden Purchase constituted the boundary but after the Purchase
lay entirely within the United States (now the State of Arizona). Understandably, Harmon
does not pursue this point further.
51. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 277 (1895).
52. In fact, Harmon seemed to go even farther, arguing that the prohibition against
works that might interfere with navigation applied only up to the "head of navigation" i.e.,
as far up the river as vessels could navigate. At one point the Attorney General claimed this
was some 150 miles downstream of El Paso (rather than several kilometers upstream of El
Paso as alleged by the Mexican Minister). 21 Op. Atty'y Gen. 274, 276 (1895). At another
point, however, he states, "[albove the head of navigation ... the river would be wholly
within the United States." Id.
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without the other's consent. It does not say that neither country shall
construct any work on that stretch of the river that may impede navigation.
The notion that water could be withdrawn just above the southern border
of New Mexico in sufficient quantities to make navigation impossible
below the U.S.-Mexico border, and that this would not be contrary to
both the letter and the spirit of Article VII, seems absurd on its face.5
Such an interpretation is also inconsistent with the principle of effectiveness.

54

In support of his interpretation, Harmon referred to the fact that
Article VII prohibits the two countries from constructing any of the
specified works. "The prohibition was.., made applicable to them alone,
and not to the citizens of either ... ."m The explanation for this, in
Harmon's view, is that such works could have been constructed on the
navigable portions of the river only by one of the two countries, or under
its authority, and not by its citizens. Conversely, in Harmon's view:
Above the head of navigation, where the river would be
wholly within the United States, different rules would apply
and private rights exist which the Government could not
control or take away save by the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, so that clear and explicit language would be
required to impose upon the United States such obligations as
would result from the construction of the treaty now suggested [by Mexico]. 5
Thus Harmon seems to be saying that unless a provision is addressed in
terms to the "citizens" of a country, it applies only to governments. But
according to Harmon, a government would apparently be powerless to
stop private citizens from diverting even all of the water of the Rio
Grande, unless compensation were paid. This seems to follow from his
statement that "private rights exist which the Government could not
control or take away save by the exercise of the power of eminent

53. In Austin's view, "whatever merit [Harmon's] argument may have as an exercise
in logic it has no relation to common sense .... What this article in fact says is that
Mexicans have the right to navigate up to the boundary and nothing shall interfere with this
right. Any other construction would reduce the clause to nonsense ....Attorney General
Harmon in this case is guilty of serious error." Austin, supra note 17, at 407.
54. "When a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does
not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and purpose of
the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be adopted." Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteenth Session,[19661 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 219, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1. The principle of effectiveness is
expressed in the maxim, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. See generally IAN SINCLAM, THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, 118 (2d ed. 1984).
55. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 277 (1895).
56. Id. at 277-78.
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domain .... " While he does not explain this statement, it seems to be
based upon a belief that the federal government has no authority to
regulate private activities affecting international watercourses unless those
activities involve navigation. He apparently assumes the diversions in
Colorado and New Mexico do not involve navigation because (a) the Rio
Grande is non-navigable in those stretches, and (1) the activities involved
are non-navigational uses. It appears that in Harmon's view, such a
"regulation" would in fact be an exercise of the power of eminent
domain-a "taking" of property, which would have to be accompanied
by the payment of compensation.
This line of reasoning calls for two comments. First, the notion
that the conduct of a state's citizens would not be covered by a treaty
provision unless it expressly required the state to regulate that conduct
reflects a lack of understanding of international law. A treaty providing
that "neither country shall construct any work that may impede the
exercise of the right of navigation" would obligate each party to ensure
that not only its government agencies but also its citizens refrained from
the acts in question. If the municipal law of one or both of the parties
required that some special measures be taken in order to implement the
treaty obligation (such as payment of compensation under United States
law), that would not affect the obligation itself.
Second, the idea that the United States government had no
authority over activities of private citizens affecting the Rio Grande above
the U.S.-Mexico border was challenged by the U.S. government itself
shortly after Harmon delivered his opinion. Following continued Mexican
complaints, in particular concerning the plan of the Rio Grande Dam and
Irrigation Company, and the affiliated Rio Grande Irrigation & Land Co.
(Ltd.), to construct dams and other works on the Rio Grande at Elephant
Butte, New Mexico, the Secretary of State wrote the Secretary of the
Interior requesting that any additional rights to build dams be denied, at
least "until the negotiations now pending between Mexico and the United
States have reached a final conclusion.""' He further suggested an
investigation of "the rights already granted to the Rio Grande Irrigation
& Land Co. (Ltd.)... with a view to ascertaining whether there is any
legal power to cancel those rights .. . .'" It later came to the attention
of the Secretary of State that "the Rio Grande River in some parts above
the international boundary line is, and has been used as, a waterway for
navigation between the United States and Mexico ... ." The Secretary

57. Letter from Secretary Olney to David Francis, Secretary of the Interior (30 Nov.
1896), reprinted in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 272, 274.
58. Id.
59. Letter from Secretary Olney to D. Francis, Secretary of the Interior (Jan. 11, 1897),
reprinted in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 292, 293.
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of State therefore inquired of the Secretary of War, who had jurisdiction
over the protection of navigable waters, whether a permit would not be
required from the War Department for this work on the ground that the
section of the Rio Grande in question was navigable within the meaning
of the relevant U.S. statutes.' Thereafter, in May, 1897, none other than
the Attorney General (Harmon had by this time been succeeded by
Joseph McKenna) brought an action against the private companies,
alleging, among other things, that: the object of the latter was "to obtain
control of the entire flow of the ...
Rio Grande" by constructing dams that
would "create the largest artificial lake in the world"; the dry air in the
region causes water to evaporate so rapidly that "but little water, after it
is distributed over the surface of the earth, would be returned to the
river"; the river was navigable "from El Paso to La Joya, about one
hundred miles above Elephant Butte"; and "the impounding of the
waters.., at... Elephant Butte will so deplete and prevent the flow of
water through the channel of said river below said dam . . .as to
seriously obstruct the navigable capacity of the said river throughout its
entire course from said point at Elephant Butte to its mouth." 61 The
United States then "set forth the treaty stipulations between the United
States and the Republic of Mexico in reference to the navigability of the
Rio Grande ... ."62 In other words, the Attorney General made the very
argument that his predecessor, Judson Harmon, had rejected two years
earlier when it had been made by Mexico.
The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the Rio
Grande was not navigable within the limits of New Mexico and that the
United States therefore lacked jurisdiction over the proposed project. The
government appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which in 1899
reversed the judgment of the court below.' The Court found it unnecessary to consider the obligations of the United States under treaties and
international law. Its obligation to preserve the navigability of navigable
waters for its own citizens, said the Court, "is certainly as great as any
arising by treaty or international law to other nations or their citizens,
and if the proposed dam and appropriation of the waters of the Rio
Grande constitute a breach of treaty obligations or of international duty
60. Letter from Secretary of State Richard Olney to Daniel Lamont, Secretary of War
(an. 13,1897), reprinted in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 295, 297. Olney had earlier
recognized that Harmon's opinion had "held that the river was not navigable above the
boundary in the sense of the treaty between the United states and Mexico, but the question
here is whether it is navigable within the meaning of the laws of the United States." Letter
from Secretary Olney to the Secretary of the Interior (Jan. 11, 1897), printed in U.S. Appendix,
supra note 4, at 292, 293.
61. United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 691-92 (1899).
62. Id. at 692.
63. Id.
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to Mexico, they also constitute an equal injury and wrong to the people
of the United States."" Since there had been no trial on the issue, the
Court assumed for purposes of the appeal that the defendants' appropriation of water would "seriously affect the navigability of the river where
it is now navigable. The right to do this is claimed by defendants and
denied by the Government... ."6 Thus the United States government
(per the Attorney General) claimed authority in this case that Harmon
had denied it possessed in the opinion he had earlier prepared for the
Secretary of State.
As Harmon had argued in that opinion, the defendants contended that the jurisdiction of the government under the applicable statute
was limited to obstructions in the navigable portions of a navigable
stream, and that the statute did not apply to the Rio Grande in New
Mexico since it was not navigable." But the Court rejected this reasoning, stating that statute extended to "anything, wherever done or
however done, within the limits of the jurisdiction of the United States
which tends to destroy the navigable capacity of one of the navigable
waters of the United States ... "67 The Court ruled that whether the act
sought to be enjoined would actually diminish the navigable capacity of
a stream was a question of fact. It therefore remanded the case to the
lower court to determine whether the defendants' project on the Rio
Grande would "substantially diminish the navigability of that stream
within the limits of present navigability, and if so, to enter a decree
restraining those acts to the extent that they will so diminish."'
The case would go back to the U.S. Supreme Court on two
additional occasions. But after the first Supreme Court decision the
United States is reported to have offered not to continue to pursue the
proceedings' if defendant companies would: "Recognize the prior right
of the people of the valley at El Paso, Mexican as well as American, to a
prior use of the waters of the Rio Grande. .. , The notion that Mexico

64. Id. at 701.
65. Id. at 702.

66. Id. at 708.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 710.
69. The British memorial states that the U.S. government offered "not to appeal from
the trial court's dismissal of the said injunction." The Rio Grande Claim, (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.),
Am. & Brit Claims Arb. 1910, Pleadings and Awards, vol. 22, Claim No. 83 (1923), Memorial

of Great Britain 15 (hereafter British Memorial). But at the stage at which the offer was
made, the case was on remand from the US. Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of
New Mexico had issued a mandate to the trial court to set aside the decree of dismissal and
proceed in accordance with the mandate of the U.S. Supreme Court. U.S. Appendix, supra
note 4, at 43-44.
70. British Memorial, supra note 69, at 15.
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has a "prior right" to Rio Grande waters, which was evidently embraced
by the Justice Department," reflects a complete reversal of position from
that stated in Attorney General Harmon's opinion. The subsequent
proceedings resulted ultimately in an order permanently enjoining the
defendant companies from constructing a dam at Elephant Butte.' But
the point of present interest is that the United States Supreme Court, in
holding that the courts could restrain, at the instance of the federal
government, any acts in New Mexico by private parties that could
diminish the navigability of the navigable portions of the Rio Grande
below El Paso, reached a result that was identical to that argued for by
Minister Romero in his protest of October, 1895, and rejected at the time
by Attorney General Harmon. While it did so on the basis of the
obligations of the United States government under domestic law, there
is nothing in the opinion that suggests the conclusion would have been
different under applicable treaties or rules of international law. Indeed,
in a dramatic reversal, the Attorney General argued in the case that the
Elephant Butte project would put the United States in violation of its
obligations under international law. 3
The portion of the Attorney General's 1895 opinion dealing with
general principles of international law embodies passages that have since
become known as the "Harmon Doctrine". These passages will be set
forth below, but their essential message is that the United States is under
no obligation to Mexico to restrain its use of the Rio Grande because its
absolute sovereignty within its own territory entitles it to dispose of the
water within that territory in any way it wishes, regardless of the
consequences in Mexico. Harmon begins his discussion by stating: "An
extended search affords no precedent or authority which has direct
bearing."74 It is true, as we have seen, that most of the law that had
developed by the time Harmon wrote his opinion dealt with navigation.
But in fact, there were by 1895 a number of authorities that addressed the
question before Harmon and upon which he could have drawn, but did
not. Some support the view of absolute sovereignty he espoused,,' but
others recognize rights in the lower riparian country.76 The only

71. The settlement offer was made by Marsden C. Burch, Special Counsel of the
Department of Justice, under instruction of the Attorney-General, John W. Griggs. British
Memorial, supra note 69, at 15.
72. United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 184 US. 416 (1902); Rio
Grande Dam and Irrigation Co. v. United States, 215 U.S. 266 (1909).
73. United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. at 700 (1899).

74. 21 Op. Atty Gen. at 280.
75. See, e.g., KLOBER, 1 EUROPA SCHES VOLUERRECHT, 128 (1821); AUGUST HEFFr

, DAS

EuRoPAscHm VOOLU
cER T vER GEGENWART, 150 (1888). These authorities are discussed by
Berber supra note 9, at 15-16.
76. See II HUGO GRorUs, DE Jum BmLu Ac PActS, Lib. 11, Cap. II, XII; the Decree of the
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authorities Harmon cites that deal specifically with international
watercourses address solely the theory of international servitudes.
Harmon states that some authors believe a lower riparian country (the
"servient" country) has an obligation to receive water from an upper
riparian (the "dominant" country) because of a natural international
servitude. But he also accepts that "[tihe dominant country may not
divert the course of the stream so as to throw it upon the territory of the
other at a different place. " " This seems to be at least an implicit
acceptance of the obligation not to cause harm to another riparian
state.' Harmon distinguishes this situation from one in which the flow
to the lower riparian country is reduced, which he characterizes as "a
diminution of the servitude."" Perhaps unwittingly, Harmon thereby
demonstrates the weakness of the servitude analogy in this context since
his reasoning suggests that the lower riparian should actually welcome a
reduction in flow. He nevertheless goes on to reason as follows: "[I]t is
evident that what is really contended for is a servitude which makes the
lower country dominant and subjects the upper country to the burden of
arresting its development and denying to its inhabitants the use of a
provision which nature has supplied entirely within its own territory. "8
Yet he finds that no writer with whom he is familiar would draw such
a consequence from the doctrine of international servitude. In fact, de
Martens, writing in 1883, did just that:
Dans le domaine des relations internationales la souverainet6
territoriale se trouve d~jh limitde par le fait de la coexistence
et de l'association des Etats. La nature m~me de leurs relations
de voisinage ne leur permet pas de disposer de leur territoire
sans aucune restriction. De IA son noes les servitudes
internationales naturelles auxquelles sont soumis tout les Etats
par suite des conditions inJvitables de leur existence physique

Provisory Executive Council of the French Republic of Nov. 16, 1792, cited in 2 P.
PRADIER-FODIRI, 2 TRAIt DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC EUROP9EN ET 'AM CAIN, (1885);
CARATHEODORY, Du DROrI INTERNATIONAL CONCERNANT LeS GRANDS COURs O'EAU, 32 (1861).

These authorities are discussed in Berber, supra note 9, at 22-23, 26. The first edition of
Oppenheim's classic work INTERNATIONAL LAw was published several years after Harmon
conducted his research, but also recognized that a state has an obligation not to "alter the
natural conditions of its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural conditions of a
territory of a neighbouring state-for instance, to stop or to divert the flow of a river which
runs from its own into a neighbouring territory." 1 LASSA OPPEN1EIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
175 (1st ed. 1905).
77. 21 Op. Atty Gen. 274, 280.
78. Id. He also accepts that "[tihe servient country may not obstruct the stream so as
to cause the water to back up and overflow the territories of the other." Id.

79. Id.
80. Id. at 281.
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les uns Acbt6 des autres.S1
But the work of this great figure in the field of international law
evidently did not come to the attention of the Attorney General. It must
be concluded that the servitude theory, especially as characterized by
Harmon, seems almost entirely inapposite to the case at hand.' Its
principal utility in the context of the opinion seems to be as a straw man:
an argument that is set up because it is easy to knock down.
Having found no authority specifically on point, Harmon turned
to general principles of international law. He stated the doctrine that
bears his name in the following words:
The fundamental principle of international law is the absolute
sovereignty of every nation, as against all others, within its
own territory. Of the nature and scope of sovereignty with
respect to judicial jurisdiction, which is one of its elements,
Chief Justice Marshall said (Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 7
Cranch [U.S. Supreme Court Reports] p. [116, atl 136 [(1812)1):
'he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it,
deriving validly from an external source, would imply a
diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction,
and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in
that power which could impose such restriction.
'All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a
nation within its own territories must be traced up to the
consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other

81. ("In the domain of international relations, territorial sovereignty is limited by the
fact of the coexistence and the society of states. The very nature of their neighborhood
relations does not permit them to dispose of their territory without any restriction. From this
are born international natural servitudes, to which all states are subject in consequence of
the inevitable conditions of their physical existence, one beside the other.-"Author's
translation) F. DE MARTENS, TRArIt DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 479 (1883) (translated from
Russian). See also Juraj Andrassy, Les Relations Internationalesde Voisinage, 79 RECUEIL DES
COURS 77, at 103 (1952).
82. This conclusion is reinforced by Oppenheim in his first edition, published ten years
after Harmon rendered his opinion. This renowned work states: "State servitudes are those
exceptional and conventional restrictions on the territorial supremacy of a State[.] ..
Servitudes must not be confounded with those general restrictions upon territorial
supremacy which, according to certain rules of the Law of Nations, concern all States alike."
Oppenheim, supra note 76, at 257-58 (footnotes omitted). As an example of such a general
restriction upon territorial supremacy Oppenheim gives a state's obligation "to admit the
free passage of foreign merchantmen through its territorial maritime belt." Id. at 258. This
is one of the examples cited by the author earlier in the work, in the section on territorial
supremacy. Another example given in that section, as noted elsewhere, is a state's obligation
not "to stop or divert the flow of a river which runs from its own into neighbouring
territory." Id. at 175.
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legitimate source.'"
What is known as the "Harmon Doctrine" thus consists of a few
rather short paragraphs in an opinion of some nine pages. And those
paragraphs consist chiefly of a quotation from an opinion of the Supreme
Court in a sovereign immunity case decided over eighty years earlier.
Harmon did attempt to bolster this brief discussion by invoking the idea
of self-preservation along with a further reference to servitudes:
[Slelf-preservation is one of the first laws of nations. No
believer in the doctrine of natural servitudes has ever suggested one which would interfere with the enjoyment by a nation
within its own territory of whatever was necessary to 8 the
4
development of its resources or the comfort of its people.
Harmon does not explain how this case, involving elective
diversions that enriched developers, fits within the idea of
self-preservation. No doubt, the doctrine of self-preservation itself was
recognized by commentators at the turn of the century.' But, as
Oppenheim pointed out as early as 1905, self-preservation was not a
right, but an excuse:
If every State really had a right of self-preservation, all the
States would have the duty to admit, suffer, and endure every
violation done to one another in self-preservation. But such
duty does not exist. On the contrary, although self-preservation is in certain cases an excuse recognized by International
Law, no State is obliged patiently to submit to violations done
to it by such other State as acts in self-preservation, but can
repulse them. It is a fact that in certain cases violations
committed in self-preservation are not prohibited by the Law
of Nations. But they remain violations and can therefore be
repulsed. Self-preservation is consequently an excuse ....
Oppenheim went on to state that it had become increasingly recognized
that
violations of other states in the interest of self-preservation are
excused in cases of necessity only. Such acts of violence in the
interest of self-preservation are exclusively excused as are
necessary in self-defence, because otherwise the acting State
would have to suffer or have to continue to suffer a violation
against itself.87

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

21 Op. Att'y Gen. at 281-82.
Id. at 282.
See Oppenheim's, supra note 76, at 177-81.
Id. at 178.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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In other words, unless they are "necessary" to prevent "an imminent
violation or the continuation of an already commenced violation," acts
contrary to international law cannot be justified under the doctrine of
self-preservation.
There are thus a number of problems with Harmon's use of
self-preservation. First, there was no question of self-defense against any
act by Mexico in violation of its obligations toward the United States,
imminent or otherwise. Thus, the acts of the United States could not have
been "necessary" in self-defense against a violation by Mexico. Second,
the invocation of self-preservation in effect admits that the United States'
diversions of Rio Grande waters were unlawful; self-preservation would
operate, in effect, as an excuse. And third, even though the United States'
violations might be excused as acts of self-preservation, there would be
no requirement that those acts "patiently be suffered and endured by"
Mexico. At the very least, Mexico would have a right to reparation for
injuries caused. Finally, it should be noted that all of the examples of acts
of self-preservation cited by Oppenheim involve uses of force in the
face of grave and imminent danger, demonstrating how inapposite the
doctrine is to the facts of the Rio Grande case.
The closest contemporary analogy to the idea of self-preservation
is probably the doctrine of "state of necessity." The International Law
Commission has characterized this doctrine as a "circumstance precluding
wrongfulness," that is, a circumstance that prevents what would
otherwise have been an internationally wrongful act from being regarded
as wrongful. A "state of necessity" is described by the Commission as "a
situation of a State whose sole means of safeguarding an essential interest
threatened by a grave and imminent peril is to adopt conduct not in
conformity with what is required of it by an international obligation to
another State."" Once again, in order to invoke this doctrine the United
States would have to admit, in effect, that the diversions of Rio Grande
waters would otherwise be unlawful. But in order to invoke the doctrine,
the United States would have to establish that one of its "essential
interests" was "threatened by a grave and imminent peril", something
that the facts would not support. In addition, even if a "state of necessity" were found to exist, the fact that the wrongfulness of the United
States' acts was precluded would not mean the United States would not
be obliged to compensate Mexico for any harm caused.'

88. Id. at 179-81.
89. [1980] Y.B. Int'l L Comm'n, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 34 (para. I of commentary to art. 33,
"State of Necessity", of Part One of the ILC's draft articles on State Responsibility).

90. In this connection, see article 35 of Part One of the LC's draft articles on State
Responsibility, "Reservation as to Compensation for Damage." Id. at 61.
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Having made the strongest case he could for complete freedom
of action, irrespective of the consequences upon other nations, the
Attorney General recognized that other factors might lead the Department of State to seek a less extreme solution:
The case presented is a novel one. Whether the circumstances
make it possible or proper to take any action from considerations of comity is a question which does not pertain to the
Department [of Justice]; but that question should be decided
as one of policy only, because, in my opinion, the rules,
principles, and precedents of international law impose no
liability or obligation upon the United States."
It is remarkable that Attorney General Harmon rested his entire
case upon two brief paragraphs from an old Supreme Court decision that
he did not proceed to apply to the facts before him. It is true that the
Supreme Court's opinion was written by one of the greatest jurists ever
to sit on the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall. But could such a great
judge, even in the early years of the nineteenth century, have in fact
intended to make pronouncements about sovereignty that are as absolute
and inflexible as they appear to be in Harmon's opinion? Reading two
sentences beyond the end of Harmon's quotation from the decision
supplies the answer. Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual
benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other, . . . all
sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases
under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and
complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which
sovereignty confers ....
A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith,
although that faith might not be expressly plighted, which should
suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial powers
in a manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations
of the civilized world.' 2
Marshall thus recognized that the realities of international intercourse and
interdependence meant that states often did not insist upon "that absolute
and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which
sovereignty confers." He also suggested that a nation that abruptly
changed the manner in which it exercised its territorial powers-as had
the United States through the greatly increased diversions in Colorado
and New Mexico---"would justly be considered as violating its faith." And

91. 21 Op. Atty Gen. at 283.
92. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37. (1812).
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finally, the rule of absolute sovereignty stated in the passages excerpted
by Harmon were not applied by the Court in the case itself: the Court
held that the United States would not exercise jurisdiction over the
Schooner Exchange, because it was a public armed vessel in the service of
a foreign sovereign. It therefore seems that neither the decision nor its
rationale supports the conclusion reached by Attorney General Harmon.
D. The Events Following the Issuance of Harmon's Opinion
In any event, the Secretary of State did not simply inform the
Mexican Minister on the basis of Harmon's opinion that in the view of
the United States it had no obligations toward Mexico and that nothing
would be done about the problem. Instead, beginning with a conversation
at the State Department on November 14, 1895, nearly a month before
Harmon delivered his opinion, Secretary Olney sought a solution to the
problem through discussions with Minister Romero." That the United
States took the matter quite seriously is attested to not only by the Joint
Resolution of Congress of 1890 but also by the frequency of communications on the subject with Mexico." These communications led the two
governments to instruct the International Boundary Commission, which
Mexico and the United States had established in 18 8 9 ," to ascertain the
facts and report on its findings.'

93. Letter from Minister Romero to Secretary Olney (Dec. 28,1985), printed in U.S.
Appendix, supra note 4, at 211-12, referring to "the conversation which we had on the 14th
ultimo [November], at the Department of State, relative to the use of the water of the Rio
Grande."
94. For example, the record reveals five recorded meetings or communications on the
case between October 21 and December 28, and an additional eight communications
between January and March of 1896. Id. at 200-23.
95. This commission had been established by the Convention between the United States
and Mexico of March 1,1889, reprinted in 1 Malloy DIGEST 1167; LEGISLATIVE TEXTS AND
TREATY PROVISIONS coNCERNING THE UTIuZATION OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS FR OTHR
PuRposES THAN NAVIGATION, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12, treaty No. 74 (1963) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE TExS]; Legal Problems Relating to the Utilization and Use of International Rivers:
Report by the Secretary General §§ 184-85, U. N. Doc. A/5409 (1963), reprinted in [19741 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMW'N vol. 76, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.l(Part 2). A later treaty
changed the name of this body to the "International Boundary and Water Commission,
United States and Mexico," and vested new powers and duties in the Commission. See
Treaty between the United States and Mexico relating to the Utilization of the Waters of the
Colorado and Tijuana Rivers, and of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) from Fort Quitman, Texas,
to the Gulf of Mexico, Feb. 3,1944, U.S. Mex., 3 U.N.T.S. 314; LEGISLATIVE TEXTS, supra, treaty

No. 77; Legal Problems Relating to the Utilization and Use of International Rivers, supra, §
212, at 80.
96. Protocol contained in note from Minister Romero to Secretary Olney (6 May 1896),
reprinted in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 225-26. Interestingly, Article V of the 1889 treaty
provides for the Commission to examine cases in which works are allegedly being
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Interestingly, the instructions included a direction to report on
"[tihe best and most feasible mode... of so regulating the use of the
waters of said river [i.e., the Rio Grande) as to secure to each country
concerned and to its inhabitants their legal and equitable rights and interests
in said waters."' This is a far cry from an assertion of absolute territorial sovereignty. Indeed, what is particularly striking about the documentary evidence of the United States' conduct following the delivery of
Attorney General Harmon's opinion is that the opinion does not seem to
have been referred to in any communications from the Secretary of State
to Mexico for a full decade following its issuance." In addition, the
United States did not act on Harmon's advice. For example, it could
simply have informed Mexico, on the basis of Harmon's opinion, that it
had no obligation to halt the diversions or provide any other kind of
relief to Mexico, and that it accordingly would not do so. Instead, the
United States agreed to form a joint fact-finding commission with a view
to reaching an equitable resolution of the matter. These two aspects of the
conduct of the United States provide at least some indication that the U.S.
government recognized Harmon's opinion for what it was: a piece of
advocacy that might be useful as a negotiating device but hardly
provided a basis for resolving concrete controversies.
The Commissioners submitted a remarkable joint report in
November, 1896." In his letter transmitting the report, the American
commissioner stated: "It is certain .

.

. that they [Mexico] have been

wronged pecuniarily to a very large extent, and the future will continue
to entail more in a progressive ratio until the matter is settled.""° In
their report, the Commissioners stated as follows:
It is the opinion of the joint commission that Mexico has been
wrongfully deprived for many years of a portion of her
equitable rights in the flow of one-half of the waters of the Rio
Grande at the time of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; and if
there were no other evidence of that fact than the records and
measurements above referred to, it is apparent to the eye of

constructed that are prohibited by Article VII of the 1948 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and
to decide whether the works are among those that are permitted or prohibited by that
treaty. This is the very article that Attorney General Harmon declared to be inapplicable to
the diversions in Colorado and New Mexico-the same diversions the two governments
instructed the Commission to investigate.
97. U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 226 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 503. As will be seen below, the Acting Secretary of State later cited Harmon's
opinion in a note to the Mexican ambassador. But he then confirmed that the United States
was prepared to deal with the matter "in accordance with the high principles of equity." Id.
99. Report of 25 Nov. 1896, reprinted in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 264.
100. Letter from Col. Anson Mills, Commissioner, to Secretary Olney (25 Nov. 18%),
reprinted in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 261, 264.
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any visitor to the locality, where can be witnessed the dying
fruit trees and vines, the abandoned fields, and dry canals for
the greatest portion that has heretofore been cultivated; and
while we are considering the equitable rights of Mexico, this
is also true of the United States side, where almost the same
abandonment and destruction of former prosperous farms may
be witnessed. m
Thus the Commissioners' joint report in effect validated the repeated
protests that had been lodged by the Mexican Minister in Washington. 2 The investigations disclosed "an increase of 454 [diversion]
canals and of 196,000 acres irrigated in the State of Colorado and
Territory of New Mexico" since 188 0 .11 While the report was not a
legal opinion per se, its dramatic factual findings highlighted the equity
of Mexico's position. Further, the findings stressed that the American
diversions effectively deprived Mexico of access to one-half of the flow
of the Rio Grande as of the conclusion of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo in 1848. It should be emphasized that the report was fully
concurred in by the American commissioner.
The report made two principal recommendations: that a storage
dam be constructed at El Paso; and that a treaty be concluded to provide for
the distribution of Rio Grande waters. On the first point the report
concluded that the "legal and equitable rights and interests" of each
country and its inhabitants to Rio Grande water could be ensured only by
constructing a dam at El Paso to impound Rio Grande flood waters." It
found that the river's flow was insufficient to support dams at both El Paso
and Elephant Butte,"s and called upon the United States to "in some way

101. Id. at 268.
102. The report concluded that
the flow of the river at El Paso has now been decreased by the taking of
water for irrigation by canals constructed in the United States of America,
about 1,000 second-feet for 100 days annually, equal to 200,000 acre-feet of
water. It will be observed that this loss is distributed through the summer
flow, which at best was not always sufficient before the diminution took
place during dry seasons. Id. at 267.
103. Id. at 265.
104. The report observes that
the great mass of [Rio Grande] waters, both before the construction of the
canals [in the United States] and since, consists of flood waters carried
down the river unused, being utterly unavailable without large reservoirs
to hold it for the season of irrigation, the maximum flow lasting but a few
days.
Id. at 267. The dam recommended would also "prevent the erosions and avulsions which
have heretofore rendered the boundary line between the two countries so uncertain,
unstable, and vexatious." Id. at 269.
105. Id. at 267. According to the report, the flow would be sufficient for a dam at Ele-
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prevent the construction of any large reservoirs" in New Mexico; this was
a indirect reference to the proposed Elephant Butte project, discussed
above.106 The Commissioners' second recommendation was that all
questions concerning the distribution of Rio Grande waters be settled in a
treaty that would provide for those waters to be divided equally between
the two countries by means of a dam to be constructed at El Paso." The
Commissioners further recommended that the United States bear all
expenses associated with the construction of the dam,"° in exchange for
which Mexico would "relinquish all claims for indemnity for the unlawful
use of waters in the past, and accept the dam so constructed as an equitable
distribution, past and future .... .109
While an agreement along the lines of that proposed by the
Commission was acceptable to Mexico, 0 Secretary Olney indicated to
Minister Romero that the State Department, "in preparing to enter into
negotiations,.., found the subject embarrassed by greatly perplexing
complications arising out of reservoir dams, etc., either already built or
authorized through the concurrent action of the Federal and State
authorities.""' According to the Secretary of State, these problems
would have to be "disposed of" before the United States would be in a
position to negotiate." 2 Part of the history of the government's subsequent efforts to "dispose" of the problems has been discussed above." 3
As indicated there, after writing the Mexican Minister, the Secretary of
State requested that the Secretary of the Interior look into whether there
were any legal means to cancel rights granted to the private companies.
He later asked the Secretary of War whether a permit would be necessary
for the construction of a dam at Elephant Butte, and if so, whether one
had been granted. As it turned out, a permit had indeed been issued to
the Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co.-by the Secretary of the Interior,

phant Butte as well as El Paso only if the company constructing the former were prevented
from appropriating the quantity of water already utilized by inhabitants of the El Paso valley, in both Mexico and the United States. Id.
106. Id. at 270.
107. Id. at 270-271.
108. The total cost of the dam was estimated at $2,317,113.36. Id. at 270. This amount was
far short of the $35,685,00 Mexico claimed to have suffered in loss of public and private
wealth due to American diversions. Letter from Minister Romero to Secretary Olney (5 Jan.
1897), reprinted in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 284.
109. Id. at 271.
110. Letter from Minister Romero to Secretary Olney (Dec. 19, 1896), reprinted in U.S.
Appendix, supra note 4, at 280.
111. Letter from Secretary Olney to Minister Romero (Jan. 4, 1897), reprinted in U.S.
Appendix, supra note 4, at 283.
112. Id.
113. See notes 57-73, supra and accompanying text.
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on February 1, 1895.114 However, the Department of Justice concluded
in April, 1897, that "the Secretary of the Interior had no power... to
grant the rights claimed," and that the company had not received the
requisite permission from the Secretary of War."' This permission was
required because of a finding by the Secretary of War that "the Rio
Grande from a point above Elephant Buttes down is a navigable water of
the United States"116-- a finding that was not disputed by then Attorney
General McKenna but must have come as something of a surprise to the
company since former Attorney General Harmon had concluded precisely
the contrary only two years earlier. The Secretary of War also found that
the proposed dam "will check the flow of the water in the river at
Elephant Butte entirely for a great portion, if not all, of the year and
impound it, and also distribute it from that point for purposes of
irrigation, so that the Rio Grande will be practically
destroyed as a stream
117
for many miles below Elephant Butte....
The U.S. government therefore sued the Company and its British
affiliate"' to prevent it from constructing a dam at Elephant Butte on

114. Letter from Secretary of the Interior Francis to Secretary of State Olney (19 Dec.
1896), reprintedin U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 277.
115. Letter from the Solicitor General to the Secretary of War, reprinted in U.S. Appendix,
supra note 4, at 319, 323.
116. Letter from Secretary Sherman to the Mexican Minister (May 12, 1897), printed in
U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 335, referring to finding of the Secretary of War mentioned
in the letter from the Secretary of War to the Attorney General (Feb. 19,1897), printed in U.S.
Appendix, supra note 4, at 313,314. This finding was apparently based at least in part on the
fact that "from El Paso up to and including the site of the proposed dam, and a good many
miles beyond that point, it [the Rio Grande] has been used to float logs for commercial and
business purposes." Id. The Secretary of the Interior had given the original authorization on
the basis of the act of March 3, 1891, which provided for
the location and selection of reservoir sites on the public lands of the
United States and rights of way for irrigating ditches and canals. There is
nothing in the act or its purposes which was intended to affect the control
or supervision of the navigable rivers of the country. That by other...
legislation is put in the Secretary of War.
Letter from the Solicitor General to the Secretary of War (Apr. 24,1897), printed in U.S.
Appendix, supra note 4, at 319, 321.
In other words, if the project would affect navigation, only the Secretary of War was
competent to issue a permit. As noted, the Secretary of War found that the stretch of the Rio
Grande in question was navigable, thereby making himself competent.
117. Letter from the Secretary of War to the Attorney General (Feb. 19, 1897), printed in
U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 313, 314.
118. Suit was brought in the U.S. District court of the Third Judicial District of the
Territory of New Mexico. See United States v. The Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Company,
9 N.M. 292, 51 P. 674 (1898)(order granting temporary injunction May 18970, in U.S.
Appendix, supra note 4, at 1; United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S.
690 (1899). The government amended its complaint to add the Rio Grande Irrigation and
Land Company, Limited, as an additional defendant. While the Rio Grande Dam and
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the grounds that the dam would "seriously obstruct the navigable
capacity of the said river""' and that the defendant had not been
authorized to construct the dam by the U.S. government. The companies
were ultimately enjoined permanently from constructing the dam at
Elephant Butte."2 This led to an arbitration between the United States
and Great Britain in which Britain claimed compensation for the United
States' allegedly having forced the British company into liquidation and
destroyed the value of its shares by suing it in bad faith. Britain's
position was that the United States' suit was in bad faith because it "was
not instituted to protect navigation on the Rio Grande, as alleged...
[but] with the object of destroying the defendant companies' Elephant
Butte Dam Project . . . in order to make it practicable to build an
International Dam on the Rio Grande."' The Arbitral Tribunal dismissed the British claim in November, 1923, on the ground that it lacked
jurisdiction because "the English Company took no valid rights whatever
under the lease from the American Company [i.e., the Rio Grande Dam
and Irrigation Co.], and possesses no interest on which a claim such as
this can be founded."'
Adding insult to injury-at least in what must have been the
view of Great Britain and the private companies-the U.S. government
had in the meantime, pursuant to a statute of February 25, 1905,11
constructed a dam near Engle, New Mexico, approximately one mile
below the Elephant Butte Dam site.' This was the "International Dam"

Irrigation Co. was organized under the laws of the Territory of New Mexico, the additional
defendant was a British corporation. As the United States stated in its Answer in a
subsequent arbitration with Britain concerning this affair "[this litigation proceeded in
regular course three times from the Territorial District Court for the Third Judicial District
of New Mexico, via the Supreme Court of New Mexico, to the Supreme court of the United
States." The Rio Grande Claim (US. v. Gr. Brit.), Am. & Brit. Claims Arb. 1910, Pleadings
& Awards, vol. 22, Claim No. 83 (1923). Answer of the United States I (hereafter U.S.
Answr).
119. Rio Grande Dam and IrrigationCo., 174 U.S. at 692.
120. United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 184 U.S. 416 (1902); Rio
Grande Dam and Irrigation Co. v. United States, 215 U.S. 266 (1909).
121. British Memorial, supra note 69, at 47.
122. The Rio Grande Claim (U.S. v. Gr.Bit.) Am. & Brit. Claims Arb. 1910, Claim No.
83, Award at 10 (1923) Interestingly, the reason the English company "took no valid rights"
according to the tribunal, was that the U.S. Alien Land Law of March 3, 1887 prohibited
aliens from owning rights or interests in real estate. Id. The English company's lease of the
American company's rights, concessions and privileges constituted an interest in real estate,
which was invalid under the Act.
123. Act of 25 Feb. 1905, 33 StaL 814. The law was entitled "An Act Relating to the
Construction of a Dam and Reservoir on the Rio Grande, in New Mexico, for the
Impounding of the Flood Waters of Said River for the Purposes of Irrigation."
124. "During the last four years of the pendency of the said litigation [between the U.S.
government and the Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co.] the Reclamation Service of the
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referred to in the passage quoted above. Secretary of State Elihu Root
described the purpose of the dam as follows:
It is... in accordance not only with the plans initiated by the
United States Government for the reclamation of the arid land
of the West, but in pursuance of the obligations incurred
through a conventional arrangement with the Republic of
Mexico, that the United States Reclamation Service is making
the preliminary surveys looking toward the erection of an
International
Dam across the Rio Grande, near Engle, New
2
Mexico. 5
The "conventional arrangement" was the 1906 treaty between the two
countries, discussed below. The 1905 Act, however, made no mention of
Mexico or obligations to that country. According to the British memorial
in the arbitration discussed above, the U.S. government's dam was
"virtually in all essential respects ... the same Elephant Butte Dam
project that the [private] Companies had planned to carry out...,I
except that the U.S. constructed "a higher storage dam" than the
companies' plans had called for."
That the United States would, on its own initiative, undertake to
construct a dam in New Mexico so similar to the private project that
seemed to have been an obstacle to resolving the dispute, a project that
the United States fought so hard to stop, must have been both confusing
and alarming to the Mexican government. Such a reaction by Mexico
would have been especially understandable in view of the recommendation in the Commissioners' report of a site that was much further
downstream, at El Paso, and that would be under the joint control of the
two countries. Indeed, a note from the Mexican Ambassador to the
Acting Secretary of State of April 26, 1905, as much as expressed these
sentiments. The note referred to the 1905 statute authorizing the Engle
Dam, noting that this statute "differs from its predecessors relative to this
same subject of an international dam, in which mention was always made
of Mexico and Mexican rights, but in this act not a word is said [thereof]

United States was steadily engaged in carrying out the said Elephant Butte [Engle Dam]
Project as a Government project." British Memorial, supra note 69, at 24-25.
125. Memorandum of Elihu Root, Secretary of State, to the British Government, as
quoted in British Memorial, supra note 69, at 30, 31.
126. British Memorial, supra note 69, at 25. The memorial quotes from a speech by Senator
Charles S. Thomas in the US. Senate in which the senator stated: "It is remarkable that a
dam constructed by private enterprise should be an obstruction to navigation, while the
same dam constructed by Government enterprise should not obstruct or interfere with such
navigation." Id.
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...
."127 The note went on to state that Mexico was anticipating "recompense" for the harm it had suffered. That harm had been assessed in a
note of June, 1904, from the Mexican Ambassador to the Secretary of
State as having doubled since Minister Romero had made his estimate of
$35.6 million eight years earlier, putting the total at over $70 million.'
The State Department responded promptly, on May 1, to Mexico's
note of 26 April.' 2 Referring to "the question of any legal liability on
the part of the United States to the Government of Mexico" for depriving
Mexico of water through diversions in Colorado and New Mexico, the
Acting Secretary of State declared that "the [State] Department is unable
to find any grounds in international law upon which such liability could
be based."" 3 "Nevertheless," the note continued, "the Government of
the United States is disposed to govern its action in the premises in
accordance with the high principles of equity and with the friendly
sentiments which should exist between good neighbors." 3' The Acting
Secretary went on to inform the Mexican Ambassador that the State
Department was in the process of preparing a draft treaty "with a view
to reaching an agreement... which shall adjust the question in accordance with the high principles of equity and comity which happily
govern the relations between the United States and Mexico." He then
offered the following explanation of the Engle Dam project:

Having in view the foregoing, the Executive is taking steps
looking towards the construction of a dam on the Rio Grande
at Engle, N. Mex., in accordance with the act of Congress of
February 25, [19051. In the opinion of the department, proceeding with this work will not stand in the way of, but will rather
hasten, the satisfactory solution of the whole question between
the two governments.'3
Thus, the U.S. government once again denied any legal liability yet
demonstrated that it was willing to go to great lengths to resolve the
dispute.

127. Letter from F. Gamboa, ChargJ d'Affaires, to A. Adee, Acting Secretary of State (26
Apr. 1905), printed in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 501.
128. Letter from Ambassador M. de Azpiroz to Secretary of State John Hay (June 3,
1904), printed in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 485, 486.
129. Letter from Acting Secretary Adee to ChargJ d'Affaires ad interim F. Gamboa (1 May
1905) printed in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 502.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 503. The note also indicated that steps were being taken to draft a treaty
for submission to Mexico concerning the Colorado River controversy between the two
countries.
133. Id. at 503.
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Mexico responded by note of August 11" which referred to
legal authorities supporting liability of the United States, including the
opinions of two Mexican jurists and citations to an American work upon
which the Mexican authors based their positions."3s The American
study, by H.P. Farnham, stated in relevant part as follows:
A river which flows through the territory of several states or
nations is their common property .... It is a great natural
highway conferring, besides the facilities of navigation, certain
incidental advantages, such as fishery and the right to use the
water for power and irrigation. Neither nation can do any act
which will deprive the other of the benefits of those rights and
advantages. The inherent right of a nation to protect itself and
its territory would justify the one lower down the stream in
preventing by force the one further up from turning the river
out of its course, or in consuming so much of the water for
purposes of its own as to deprive the former of its benefit ....

136

Thus Farnham zrelied on a principle closely akin to that of
self-preservation to support a conclusion that is the precise opposite of
what Attorney General Harmon had derived from the same principle.
It should be emphasized at this point that the fact that Harmon
and Farnham could derive diametrically opposed conclusions from the
same general principle demonstrates the lack of utility of principles that
allow a country to take virtually any action in the name of protecting
itself against a peril that, according to its unilateral determination,
confronts it.
The Mexican note concluded by stressing that country's "best
disposition to bring an end to [the] question ... ,,13 Secretary of State
Elihu Root replied on December 19, 1905, that the United States was
unable to accept the soundness of the Mexican legal position."3' Secretary Root explained that since the opinions of the two Mexican authors
had been based upon the American work, and since that work had cited
no decision or text in support of its conclusion, inquiry had been made
of the American author as to the basis of his position. Root reported that
134. Letter from F. Gamboa, ChargJ d'Affaires ad interim, to Elihu Root, Secretary of State
(11 Aug. 1905), printed in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 503.
135. Id. at 504, citing 1 FARNHAM, LAW OF WATERs AND WATER RicHTrs, 29,63 (1904). Mr.
Gamboa's note of August 11, 1905, after referring to "the doctrine set up by H.P. Farnham,"
stated that "on that doctrine rest the opinions of the two Mexican jurists above named."
136. 1 H. P. Farnham, Law of Waters and Water Rights 29 (1904)
137. Letter from ChargJ d'Affaires ad interim Gamboa to Secretary of State Root,
Secretary of State (Aug. 11, 1905), printed in U.S. Appendix, supra note 5, at 505.
138. Letter from Secretary Root to Joaquin D. Casasus, Mexican Ambassador (Dec. 19,
1905), printed in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 517.
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"Mr. Farnham answered in substance that the expressions contained in
the text were merely his personal opinions, deduced from a comparison
of treaties, text writers, and decisions."1 ' This is of .course not unusual,
since principles of customary international law must be deduced from a
study of state practice and evidence of custom such as that contained in
decisions and learned works. Secretary Root went on to state that he did
not intend to "reopen any argument on the legal questions involved" but
reaffirmed the United States position, "taken in accordance with the
advice of Attorney General Harmon, of the nonliability of the United
States Government for the claims for indemnity heretofore brought
" 4
forward by Mexico on account of the aforesaid diversion of waters. ' 0
But, the Secretary continued, the question "appears to have become
academic, since both Governments have announced their purpose to deal
with the question on principles of the highest equity and comity between
neighboring States."' Secretary Root accordingly enclosed a copy of a
letter from the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) containing
proposals for a treaty between the two countries, "which is intended to
treat the question on a basis of absolute equity."'1 2 He stated that if
Mexico considered these proposals satisfactory, one country or the other
could submit a draft treaty based thereon for the other's consideration.
It is worth noting that in a section of the letter from the Director
of the USGS entitled "History of the Discussion," the Director quotes
from Harmon's opinion but then states that notwithstanding that advice,
the public discussion of this matter has tended to the view
that in the interests of international comity the question should
not be decided upon its purely legal aspects, more particularly
in view of the plans considered by the International (Water)
Boundary Commission .... The effort of this commission has
been to devise some means of obtaining a supply of water for
the Mexican lands without unduly depriving lands within the
limits of the United States.'4 3
The latter effort at achieving a balance between the interests of the United
States and those of Mexico bears a striking similarity to the process of
arriving at an equitable allocation of the benefits of the Rio Grande. The

139. Id. at 518.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. The letter from Chas. D. Walcott, Director of the U.S. Geological Survey to Secretary of the Interior E.A. Hitchcock (April 20,1905), printed in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at
509; see also "Suggestions for a Treaty between the United States and Mexico" Id. at 516.
143. Letter from Chas. D. Walcott, Director of the U.S. Geological Survey to Secretary
of the Interior E.A. Hitchcock (Apr. 20, 1905), printed in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 511.
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United States Supreme Court was to announce only two years later, in its
1907 decision in Kansas v. Colorado, that disputes between states of the
United States over shared water resources were to be resolved in such a
way as to achieve an equitable apportionment of those resources.'
That decision was foreshadowed in an earlier phase of the case"4 in
which the Court, in 1902, overruled the demurrer of Colorado, the
upstream state. The Court held that disputes between U.S. states were
governed by principles of international law, among others, and-contrary
to Colorado's position of absolute territorial sovereigntyI4--found that
facts might exist that would justify its interposition. 14 7 It is not known
to what extent this litigation may have influenced the U.S. government's
position in the dispute with Mexico, or vice versa; but the end result in
both cases was an effort to apportion the waters in question in an
equitable manner.
E. The Settlement of the Dispute in the 1906 Convention
After the submission to Mexico of the draft prepared by the
USGS, the two countries moved quickly to agreement. Mexico proposed
three revisions in March, 1906,' but when these were rejected by the
United States 49 Mexico accepted the draft essentially as originally
submitted." ° The Convention between the United States of America and
Mexico concerning the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio
Grande for Irrigation Purposes,' the first treaty entered into by the
United States that deals exclusively with international watercourses, was
signed at Washington on May 21, 1906, by Ambassador Casasus and

144. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 27 S.Ct. 655 (1907).
145. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 22 S.Ct. 552 (1902) (on demurrer).
146. 185 U.S. at 143. Colorado argued that "she may absolutely and wholly deprive
Kansas and her citizens of any use of or share in the waters of [the Arkansas] river," that
"Itihe rule of decision... is the rule which controls foreign and independent States in their
relations to each other; [and) that by the law of Nations the primary and absolute right of
a State is self-preservation ... " Id.
147. Id. at 147.
148. Letter from Ambassador Casasus to Secretary Root (Mar. 28, 1906), printed in H.R.
Doc. No. 359, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. at 410 (1930). The three proposed revisions concerned the
amount of water to be furnished to Mexico, the place of delivery of the water, and the
disposition of any excess water. Id.
149. Letter from Robert Bacon, Acting Secretary of State to Ambassador Casasus (1 May
1906), printed in H.RL Doc. No. 359, supra note 146, at 412.
150. Letter from Ambassador Casasus to Secretary Root (May 10, 1906), printed in H.R.
Doc.No. 359, supra note 146, at 413.
151. Convention Concerning the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande
for Irrigation Purposes, May 21, 1906, U.S.-Mex., T.S. No. 455 (entered into force Jan. 16,
1907) [hereinafter 1906 Treaty].
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Secretary Root. It entered into force on January 16, 1907. The preamble of
the treaty contains the following language:

The United States of America and the United States of Mexico
being desirous to provide for the equitable distribution of the
waters of the Rio Grande for irrigation purposes, and to
remove all causes of controversy between them in respect
thereto, and being moved by considerations of international
resolved to conclude a Convention for these
comity, have
1 2
purposes. 5
The treaty provides that, after completion of the storage dam near Engle,
New Mexico, the United States is to deliver 60,000 acre-feet of water to
Mexico annually, in the bed of the Rio Grande, in accordance with an
annexed schedule. The delivery of the water is to be without cost to
Mexico. The treaty also provides that Mexico waives all claims arising out
of diversions in the United States and that:
The United States, in entering into this treaty, does not thereby
concede, expressly or by implication, any legal basis for any
claims heretofore asserted or which may be hereafter asserted
by reason of any losses incurred by the owners of land in
Mexico due or alleged to be due to the diversion of the waters
of the Rio Grande within the United States; nor does the
United States in any way concede the establishment of any
general principle or precedent by the concluding of this treaty.
The understanding of both parties is that the arrangement
contemplated by this treaty extends only to the portion of the
Rio Grande which forms the international boundary ....13
Thus the United States preserved its formal legal position in the treaty,
while actually agreeing to apportion the water in a manner both parties
considered "equitable."
The events reviewed above' s demonstrate that it was extremely
important to the United States to resolve its dispute with Mexico over Rio
Grande waters. It was so important that the United States would initiate

152. Id. at preamble.
153. 1906 Treaty, supra note 151, art, V. The only change made in the text of the draft
treaty originally submitted to Mexico was the substitution of "is" for the phrase "being that
this action of the United States is prompted only by considerations of international comity
and" after the words, "The understanding of both parties". See H.R. Doc. No. 359, supra
note 148, at 403-09.
154. For a summary of these events, see W.L. GRIFFIN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, LEGAL
AsPEc s OF THE USE OF SYSTEMS OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS WITH REFERENCE TO
COLUMBiA-KOOTENAY RIVER SYSTEM UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
TREATY OF 1909, S. Doc. 118, 85th Congress, 2nd Sess. (1958) thereinafter GRIIN
MEMORANDUM].
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and tenaciously pursue protracted litigation to halt a private dam project
in order to be certain it could control the quantity of water delivered to
Mexico. And it was so important that the United States would agree to
pay the considerable costs of guaranteeing Mexico its share. The great
lengths to which the United States was willing to go to in fulfillment of
its "moral obligation"1 1' to provide Mexico with a fair share of Rio
Grande waters suggest that regardless of its formal reliance on the
Harmon Doctrine it did not consider itself free to exhaust the flow of the
Rio Grande before it reached Mexico. This conclusion is reinforced by the
practice of the United States in other cases.
Ill. THE "HARMON DOCTRINE" IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER
UNITED STATES PRACTICE
In a number of instances the United States has taken positions
inconsistent with the Harmon Doctrine. The arguments of the United
States in these cases tend to reinforce the conclusion that the Harmon
Doctrine represented advocacy in a particular case rather than a
statement of what the United States objectively regarded as a principle of
international law, We may begin this survey some eight months before
Attorney General Harmon's opinion was issued, when the United States
requested of Great Britain that "suitable measures.., be taken to avert
the threatened injury" from a dam, or "dyke", which a corporation of the
Canadian Province of British Columbia planned to construct on Boundary
Creek "where it crosses the boundary line, the result of which would be
the overflow and washing away of the lands and improvement of settlers
in the [U.S.] State of Idaho."'- 6 In the event, work on the dam proceeded, resulting in the apprehended injuries, whereupon the United States
requested prompt "removal of the obstruction in the creek, and the
payment of proper indemnity to those who had been injured .. . . 7
This case demonstrates that the United States, at least with regard to
flooding, was not prepared to admit that a state was completely free to
dispose of the portion of an international watercourse within its borders.
Indeed, even Attorney General Harmon's opinion itself technically does not deny that there is a duty on the part of one State to avoid
causing injury to another State by means of actions wholly within the
territory of the first State. This point-that a state's sovereignty over its
rivers does not give it license to harm other states-was made by an
American negotiator of the 1909 treaty concerning boundary waters

155. See note 99, and accompanying text.
156. Question as to Running Water, 2 Moore DIGESr § 226 at 451452.
157. Id. at 451.
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between the United States and Canada," Chandler P. Anderson. In a
communication to the then Secretary of State Elihu Root, Anderson wrote:
[Aibsolute sovereignty carries with it the right of inviolability
as to such territorial waters, and inviolability on each side
imposes a coextensive restraint upon the other, so that neither
country is at liberty to so use its own waters as to injuriously
affect the other.... ITIhe conclusion is justified that international law would recognize the right of either side to make
any use of the waters on its side which did not interfere with
the coextensive rights of the other, and was not injurious to it
The theoretical opposite of the Harmon Doctrine is the doctrine
of absolute territorial integrity. That theory, when applied to international
watercourses, would mean that an upstream state could do nothing that
would interfere with the natural flow of the watercourse into the
downstream state. Among the few states that have invoked this doctrine
is, ironically, the United States. In a memorandum prepared for the
United States Agent in the Trail Smelter arbitration,W a case involving
transfrontier air pollution rather than use of an international watercourse,
the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State declared:
it is a fundamental principle of the law of nations that a
sovereign state is supreme within its own territorial domain
and that it and its nationals are entitled to use and enjoy their
territory and property without interference from an outside
source.
Interestingly, among the authorities the Legal Adviser cited in support of
this proposition was the very U.S. Supreme Court case relied upon by
Attorney General Harmon in support of the absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon."r The Legal Adviser
opined that an international wrong had been committed in the Trail
158. Treaty Relating to the Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the Boundary
between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Can., 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548,
12 Bevans 319.
159. GRIFFIN MEMORANDUM, supra note 154, at 60-61.
160. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), was reported in 3 R.LA.A. 1905, (1941); reprinted in 35

AM. J. INTL L. 684 (1941).
161. Memorandum in Relation to the Arbitration of the Trail Smelter Case, (U. S. v.
Can.), Aug. 10, 1937, prepared by Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser, for Swagar Sherley,

at 183. Cf. the
Agent of the United States, printed in Territorial Integrity, 5 Whiteman, DIGEMS
position advanced by Australia in the Nuclear Tests Cases of the early 1970s, that it had

"decisional sovereignty" over whether nuclear fallout could be deposited on its territory,
irrespective of whether Australia could prove that the fallout actually caused harm.
(N.Z. v. Fr.) 1978 I.CJ. 188 (Pleadings).
NUCLEAR T
162. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136. (1812). See also note 84, supra and accompanying text.
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Smelter case, consisting of "acts which deprive us of the free and
untrammeled use of our territory in a manner which we as a sovereign
state have an inherent and incontestable right to use it."" While Trail
Smelter involved transfrontier air pollution, emanating from a smelter at
Trail, British Columbia, Canada, and causing harm in the U.S. state of
Washington, the Legal Adviser's memorandum drew no distinction
between harm caused by putting something into another state, on the one
hand, and withholding something, on the other. Indeed, both change the
natural status quo and interfere with a state's ability to dispose of its
territory as it sees fit. If and to the extent that the former is prohibited,
the latter should be as well. Otherwise, not only wholesale diversions of
international watercourses, but also such activities as weather modification to the detriment of another state would be legitimized-a result that
promotes neither the reasonable sharing of common natural resources nor
friendly relations between states.
The circumstances leading up to a subsequent treaty between the
United States and Mexico shed further light on the U.S. position. In 1924
Congress passed an "Act providing for a study regarding the equitable
use of the waters of the Rio Grande below Fort Quitman, Texas, in
co-operation with the United States of Mexico."'" The statute authorized the President to appoint three members of a joint commission to be
formed with Mexico. The commission would study the "equitable use"
of the waters of the Rio Grande. As Mexico was not willing to discuss the
Rio Grande without dealing with the Colorado River as well, the scope
of the commission's mandate was broadened by a joint resolution to
include the Colorado.'" The resolution provided that the American
commissioners were "to cooperate with representatives of the Government of Mexico in a study regarding the equitable use of the waters of
the lower Colorado Rivers ....""" That the commissioners' mandate
was broadened in this way is of interest because while the Rio Grande is
a contiguous watercourse "below Fort Quitman, Texas," the Colorado is
for the most part a successive river. (A "continguous" watercourse forms
the border between two states while a "successive" one crosses the
border.)
The negotiations concerning the Colorado, in particular, proved
difficult and became protracted. In a memorandum dated 26 May 1942

163. Schooner Exchange, 11 US. at 136. The tribunal in fact quoted Professor Eagleton
approvingly to the effect that: "A State owes at all times a duty to protect other States
against injurious acts by individuals from within its jurisdiction." Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A.
at 1963.
164. Law of May 13, 1924, ch. 153, § 1, 43 Stat. 118 (codified at 22 US. C. § 277 (1988)).
165. See generally Particular Rivers: Colorado, 3 Whiteman DIGEsT § 13, at 945.
166. Law of Mar. 3, 1927, ch. 381, § 1, 44 Stat. 1403.
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relating to these discussions, the Legal Adviser of the State Department" 7 reviewed existing treaties regarding international rivers and
lakes. He stated that the review
is by no means comprehensive but is believed to be sufficient
to indicate the trend of thought concerning the adjustment of
questions relating to the equitable distribution of the beneficial
uses of such waters. No one of these agreements adopts the
early theory advanced by Attorney General Harmon .... On
the contrary, the rights of the subjacent state are specifically
recognized and protected by these agreements.'"
In a second memorandum, written in November of the same
year, the Legal Adviser addressed the rights of Mexico to water
impounded by Boulder Dam in the United States:
The question with which we are confronted is what is Mexico
entitled to, under all the circumstances, as her fair and
equitable portion of the impounded waters of a stream which
if left in the state of nature would afford a certain amount of
water to both countries-insufficient for the needs of either at
the lowest stage and more than can be utilized by either or
both at flood stage....
The rights of the United States and Mexico in this
situation cannot be determined by fixed rules of law, nor can
they be determined by the simple criterion that the water has
its source in the United States and may be utilized in this
country. Such a rule, if sound or if applied, would deprive all
subjacent States of the normal and natural benefits of streams
the world over. Our purpose should be to find a reasonable
equation by which rights to the water may be equitably
W '
distributed.
In 1944, the United States and Mexico signed the agreement to
which the foregoing statements relate, concerning the lower Rio Grande
and Colorado Rivers.'"e The treaty provides for the allocation of the
waters of the two rivers and the construction of works. When the treaty
was being considered by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
as part of the United States ratification process, an opponent testified that
167. As indicated in note 44, supra, the State Department did not have its own, in-house
lawyer until the position of Legal Adviser of the Department of State was created by Act
of Congress in 1931.
168. Memorandum of G. Hackworth, Legal Adviser of the Department of State (May 26,
1942), printed in Particular Rivers: Colorado, 3 Whiteman DIGEST § 13, at 950.
169. Id. at 953-954.
170. Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico relating to the utilization
of the waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers, and of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) from
Fort Quitman, Texas, to the Gulf of Mexico, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 3 U.N.T.S. 314.
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Attorney General Harmon's opinion was a correct statement of the law
as practiced by the United States. Three executive branch officials
challenged this assertion. First, an Assistant Legal Adviser of the
Department of State, after pointing out that the Harmon opinion was
based primarily on language from the Schooner Exchange case, which did
not involve the question of the allocation of waters of international rivers,
stated as follows:
[Tihe contention that... The United States can properly refuse
to arbitrate a demand by Mexico for additional waters of the
Colorado is, to say the least, extremely doubtful, particularly
when the Harmon opinion is viewed in the light of the
following:
(a) The practice of states as evidenced by treaties
between various countries, including the United
States, providing for the equitable apportionment of
waters of international rivers.
(b) The decisions of domestic courts giving effect to
the doctrine of equitable apportionment, and
rejecting, as between the States, the Harmon doctrine.
(c) The writing of authorities on international law
in opposition to the Harmon doctrine.
(d) The Trail Smelter Arbitration .... 17
Second, then Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the
following statement on the point under consideration:
The logical conclusion of the legal argument of the opponents
of the treaty appears to be that an upstream nation by unilateral act in its own territory can impinge upon the rights of a
downstream nation; this is hardly the kind of legal doctrine
that can be seriously urged in these times."n
And finally, Mr. Frank Clayton, counsel for the United States section of
the International Boundary Commission, stated:
Attorney General Harmon's opinion has never been followed
either by the United States or by any other country of which
I am aware.... I have made an attempt to digest the international treaties on this subject .... [11n all those I have been
able to find, the starting point seemed to be the protection of
the existing uses in both the upper riparian country and the

171. Treaty with Mexico Relating to Utilization of Waters of CertainRivers: Hearingsbefore the
Senate Committee on ForeignRelations. 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1751 (1945) (Testimony of Mr. Ben
M. English, Assistant Legal Adviser of the Department of State).
172. Id. at 1762.
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lower riparian country, without regard to asserting the
doctrine of exclusive territorial sovereignty. Most of them
endeavor to go further than that and to make provision for
expansion in both countries, both upper and lower, within the
limits of the available supply.r
A fitting postscript to the conclusion of the 1944 treaty was provided by
Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who observed, upon the
treaty's approval by the U.S. Senate, that it would allow Mexico and the
United States to "cooperate as good neighbors in developing the vital
water resources of the rivers in which each has an equitable interest." 4
In a dispute a few years later between the United States and
Canada over the Columbia River,'" the position of the United States
was reversed. Here it was a downstream state, at the mercy of the
upstream state but for any constraints imposed on the latter by international law. The dispute was ultimately resolved by the 1961 Columbia
River Basin Treaty,17" an agreement which one commentator characterized as having "ended one of the bitterest debates ever waged between
Canada and the United States."" The Columbia rises in the Columbia
Ice Field in British Columbia, Canada, flows across the U.S.-Canadian
border into the state of Washington and empties into the Pacific Ocean
at the border between the states of Washington and Oregon. It is joined
in Canada by the Kootenay River, which originates in Canada then flows
into the United States before returning to Canada and merging with the
Columbia.

173. Id. at 97-98.
174. 12 DEP'T ST. BULL. 742 (1945). The President of the United States made the following
statement concerning the approval by the Senate of the 1944 treaty:
In voting its approval of the water treaty with Mexico, the Senate today
gave unmistakable evidence that it stands firmly in support of the
established policy of our Government to deal with our good neighbors on
the basis of simple justice, equity, friendly understanding, and practical
cooperation. By this action of the Senate, the United States and Mexico join
hands in a constructive, businesslike program to apportion between them
and develop to their mutual advantage the waters of the rivers that are in
part common to them.
Id.
175. See generally Particular Rivers: Columbia, 3 Whiteman DIGEST § 15, at 978 (1964);
Ralph Johnson, The Columbia Basin, in INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note 5, at
167; L. BLOOMFELD & G. FrT.GERALD, BOUNDARY WATERS PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND THE

UNITED STATES 46 (1958); Charles Bourne, The Columbia River Controversy, 37 CAN. BAR REv.
444 (1959). The dispute was the subject of a reference to the International Joint Commission,
United States and Canada. See BLOOMFIELD & FITZGERALD, supraat 164 (summary of Docket
No. 51).
176. Treaty relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the
Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961, U.S.-Can., 15 U.S.T. 1555.
177. Johnson, supra note 175, at 167.
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While it took on a number of complexities before it was resolved,
the dispute had its genesis in a 1951 U.S. proposal to construct Libby
Dam on the Kootenay River in Montana. The reservoir behind the dam
would have flooded 42 miles of Canadian territory and raised the water
level some 150 feet at the border. The United States offered to compensate Canada for flooding the lands and the resulting dislocations, but not
for the power benefits that the raised water level in Canada would have
provided, both at Libby Dam itself and further downstream. Canada
insisted on a share of the power benefits and indicated that it might
divert the Kootenay into the Columbia, an action that would deny Libby
and other Kootenay dams the diverted waters.'" Canada later announced the possibility of diverting up to 15 million acre-feet annually
from the Columbia into the Fraser River Basin,'" which for present
purposes may be considered as being situated entirely within Canada.
The two states ultimately agreed upon a comprehensive and
integrated plan for the development of the resources of the Columbia
River Basin. Canada agreed to construct large storage dams, which would
benefit the United States by enhancing downstream power generation
and protecting against floods. The United States agreed to provide
Canada with one-half the additional power resulting from the Canadian
projects and to pay Canada for flood control benefits.8"
During the course of the dispute the United States took positions
that were very similar to those espoused by Mexico, and rejected by the
U.S., in the earlier Rio Grande controversy. For example, in contesting the
Canadian proposal to divert Columbia River waters into the Fraser River
basin, the United States relied in part on the doctrine of "prior appropriation," under which "the appropriator who is first in time is first in right."
The United States referred in this connection to the substantial investments that it had made in hydroelectric plants on the lower Columbia
River and indicated that the proposed diversion would result in serious
injury to these downstream interests.""' This position bears a striking
similarity to that taken by Mexico in the dispute over the Rio Grande,
when Mexico contended that the claim of Mexican farmers to Rio Grande
water "is incontestable, being prior to that of the inhabitants of Colorado
by hundreds of years .... ' The United States further argued that

178. Id. at 198-99.
179. Particular Rivers: Columbia, 3 Whiteman DIGEST § 15, at 982.
180. Johnson, supra note 175, at 168.
181. Particular Rivers: Columbia, 3 Whiteman DIGEsT § 15, at 982, (quoting from a
statement of the Chairman of the United States Section of the International Joint
Commission, Governor Len Jordan). See also Johnson, supra note 175, at 205-07, summarizing
U.S.and Canadian arguments.
182. See note 45,supra and accompanying text.
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Canada's reliance upon article II of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty'
between the two countries was misplaced, because "the reservation of
sovereign rights in article II is based on the Harmon Doctrine, which is
not part of international law"si-thus repudiating the extreme position
it had taken in its dispute with Mexico.
While Canada had indeed argued that article II of the 1909 treaty
embodied the Harmon Doctrine, in the end both sides agreed that this
self-centered policy "was more in tune with the pre-industrial revolution
era . . . than with the close economic, social and political ties that
characterize our present, rapidly shrinking world."'"5 The Harmon
Doctrine thus "suffered an ignominious rout," while the principle of
equitable apportionment of the benefits of an international watercourse
"gained enormously in prestige and acceptance."1 s6
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A number of conclusions are suggested by the foregoing review
of documentary evidence of the attitudes and behavior of the United
States in relation to the "Harmon Doctrine." First, it is clear that the
United States did take a formal legal position of absolute territorial
sovereignty in its dispute with Mexico at the turn of the century
concerning the Rio Grande. This position was first articulated in an
opinion by Attorney General Judson Harmon in response to a request by
the Secretary of State for legal advice concerning the dispute. Harmon's
opinion was referred to at least twice by high State Department officials
in communications with Mexico.
Second, it is not clear that the United States, in the context of the
Rio Grande dispute, actually believed that the "Harmon Doctrine" of
absolute territorial sovereignty represented an existing rule of international law governing the relations of states with regard to international

183. Treaty relating to the Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the Boundary
between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, US.-Can., 36 Stat. 2448,12 Bevans 319.
In essence, article II reserves to each of the two countries "the exclusive jurisdiction and
control over the use and diversion... of all waters on its own side of the line which in their
natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters." Id. It also
provides that any diversion of these waters causing injury on the other side of the boundary
"shall give rise to the same rights and entitle the injured parties to the same legal remedies
as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs." Id.
Canada argued that the latter provision made clear that the intent of the treaty was to
permit the contemplated diversions but to permit private parties injured thereby to seek
redress through the courts.

184. See Bloomfield and Fitzgerald, supra note 175 at 46.
185. See Johnson, supra note 175, at 235.
186. Id. at 235.
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watercourses. If it had considered this to be the applicable rule, one
would have expected its behavior, and its expectations of Mexico, to have
conformed to a reasonable degree with the Doctrine's precepts. But rather
than acting on the basis of Harmon's advice, the United States acceded
to Mexico's demands and entered into an agreement that apportioned the
waters in what the agreement described as an equitable manner. And
perhaps even more tellingly, far from following the Doctrine by allowing
its citizens free rein to divert Rio Grande waters, the United States
government sued those citizens, among others, to prevent them from
depriving Mexico of its fair share of Rio Grande waters. Indeed,
Harmon's opinion stands out as an anomaly-albeit a rather dramatic
one-when viewed in the context not only of the United States' conduct
in the dispute, but also of other statements by the United States
government itself. Arrayed against a solitary opinion of an Attorney
General are a joint resolution of Congress, a statement of the President,
and numerous conciliatory statements by State Department officials, all
seeking to apportion Rio Grande waters fairly with Mexico.
And third, the practice of the United States in disputes subsequent to the Rio Grande controversy--even those (such as the controversies over the Colorado and Rio Grande leading to the 1944 treaty) in
which the United States was in an upstream position--demonstrate that
the United States has gone to great lengths to repudiate the Doctrine, and
has even maintained that it never represented the law.
It might be thought that in the Rio Grande controversy the
United States was in fact motivated principally by a desire to ensure that
its citizens in upstream states (Colorado and New Mexico) did not
deprive its citizens in downstream states (New Mexico and Texas) of Rio
Grande water; and that Mexico was merely an incidental beneficiary of
the U.S. government's efforts in this regard. Such a theory is not
supported on the record, however. Perhaps curiously, there are very few
references to American citizens in downstream states in the documents
of the era concerning whether diversions in Colorado and New Mexico
should be allowed to continue unchecked. But it is even more revealing
that the private Elephant Butte dam project was halted not at the instance
of the Bureau of Reclamation or any other agency concerned with
domestic water supply, but at the instance of the Department of State.
This strongly suggests that the United States government's chief concern
was in fact being able to guaranty a sufficient flow of Rio Grande water
for Mexico.
The question of exactly what Attorney General Harmon said in
his opinion has also been the subject of close scrutiny. As one commentator has observed, the Harmon Doctrine itself is not necessarily a
statement of the law of international watercourses but "an assertion that,
there being no rules of international law which governed, states were free
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to do as they wished. "'1 7 And as a State Department memorandum has
pointed out, "the truism that a state is sovereign in its territory does not
lead to the conclusion that a state may legally make unlimited use of
waters within its territory.""M Since there are in fact two sovereignties
involved-that of the downstream state as well as that of the upstream
state-states riparian to an international watercourse operate under
reciprocal constraints.' 9 Moreover, while Harmon emphasized the
complete freedom of a state as to portions of international watercourses
situated within its territory, he did not deny-and in fact recognized-that there was a duty to refrain from harming other states.
In his influential work on international watercourses, Herbert
Smith comments upon Harmon's view that the case was one of first
impression: "Although authority in 1895 was not plentiful, the problem
was not . . . entirely a novel one, and indeed Mr. Harmon's vague
reference to 'precedents' seems inconsistent with the suggestion of
novelty," "' Smith goes on to remark that: "The opinion clearly rests
upon an insufficient analysis both of principles and of practice ... ,
and concludes that "Mr. Harmon's attitude seems to have been merely
the caution of the ordinary lawyer who is determined not to concede
unnecessarily a single point to the other side.""
In view of the foregoing examination of the practice of the United
States, this latter statement is probably the most accurate way to
characterize Attorney General Harmon's opinion. The United States did
not follow the "Harmon Doctrine" in the dispute that gave birth to it, nor
has it acted in accordance with the Doctrine in subsequent controversies
187. Upper, supra note 6, at 22-23.
188. See the GRFFIN MEMMANOuM, supra note 154, at 60-61. Interestingly, this document

was prepared in response to a request by the US. Senate for a memorandum on the
international law applicable to Canada's proposed diversions from the Kootenay River into
the Columbia River (which flows into the United States) and from the Columbia into the
Fraser River (which is an entirely Canadian river, emptying into the Strait of Georgia at
Vancover, B.C).
The point made in the quotation was also recognized in a 1952 United Nations study:
Each riparian State has a right of ownership over the section of the
waterway which traverses it, and this right restricts the freedom of action
of the others. Nevertheless, the fact that each State is obliged to respect the
right of ownership of the other States in no way impairs its sovereign
power.
U.N. EcoNoMic CoMW'N oN EuRoPE, LEGAL ASPEcrS OF THE HYDRO-ELEcTRIC DEVELoPMENT OF RIVM AND LAKES OF CoMMoN INTERESr 209, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/136 (1952).

189. See the statement of Chandler P. Anderson in text accompanying note 160, supra
and accompanying text.
190. Herbert Arthur Smith, The Economic Uses of International Rivers 42 (1931).
191. d.
192. Id. at 145.
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concerning international watercourses. States do not, and cannot, exist in
isolation. This is all the more true with regard to their use of shared
water resources, as the government officials quoted above have recognized. On the basis of policy as well as practice, therefore, the "Harmon
Doctrine" of absolute territorial sovereignty should, one hundred years
after it was enunciated, be laid to a richly-deserved rest.

